We consider a selective vehicle routing problem, in which customers belonging to di erent partners in a logistic coalition are served in a single logistic operation with multiple vehicles. Each partner determines a cost of non-delivery (CND) for each of its customers, and a central algorithm creates an operational plan, including the decision on which customers to serve and in which trip. e total transportation cost of the coalition is then divided back to the partners through a cost allocation mechanism. is paper investigates the e ect on the cost allocation of a partner's strategy on nondelivery penalties (high/low) and the properties of its customer locations (distance to the depot, degree of clustering). e e ect of the cost allocation method used by the coalition is also investigated. We compare the well-known Shapley value cost allocation method to our novel problem-speci c method: the CND-weighted cost allocation method.
Introduction and literature review
In recent years horizontal collaboration has become increasingly popular in the road transportation industry. e basic idea underlying this innovative business model is that distribution companies can signi cantly increase the e ciency of their operations by joining forces and becoming partners in a horizontal logistic coalition. Especially by solving a collaborative vehicle routing problem, i.e., a vehicle routing problem in which customers that would normally be served by di erent transportation companies are assigned to shared vehicle routes, less kilometers can be driven with trucks that have a higher average ll rate (European Commission, 2011; Capgemini, 2008) .
On the other hand, the added complexity of this novel way of working does not come without its challenges. One of the most important issues that needs to be tackled is that of cost allocation (also called gain sharing, depending on the perspective). A coalition incurs a single global coalition cost, which must be paid by the individual partners. e coalition must therefore install a method to allocate the total coalition cost to the partners. If a partner perceives its allocated share of the coalition cost to be too large, it might leave the coalition. Notwithstanding its importance, the cost allocation problem has been widely ignored in the literature on collaborative vehicle routing.
Speci c contributions in the eld of collaborative vehicle routing are still few and far between. e main body of research on this topic is focused on the demonstration of the gains by means of simulation (Hageback and Segerstedt, 2004; Cruijssen and Salomon, 2004; Palander and Väätäinen, 2005; Le Blanc et al., 2006; Ergun et al., 2007) , or by reporting on actual case studies (Wiegmans, 2005; Bahrami, 2002; Cruijssen et al., 2007; Frisk et al., 2010; Defryn et al., 2014) . Studies on collaborative vehicle routing topics always aggregate the customers of the di erent partners into one single non-collaborative vehicle routing problem. In this way, however, company-speci c strategies and objectives are ignored and the collaborating partners are implicitly merged into one entity. In this paper, we argue that solving a collaborative vehicle routing problem requires a more problem-speci c approach, that explicitly takes into account the interaction between the vehicle routing problem and the cost allocation method. In Vanovermeire and Sörensen (2014a) , an approach is developed that explicitly integrates the cost allocation method into the operational planning method, resulting in an optimization problem that looks for the least-cost solution under the constraints that each partner should be adequately rewarded for the changed delivery dates of its customers. Such an approach, however, considerably complicates the optimization problem and is therefore not a viable approach in all situations. e Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) , the Nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969; Leng and Parlar, 2005) , the Equal Pro t Method (Frisk et al., 2010) and the volume-based allocation are some of the most well-known allocation methods. Some use a game theoretical approach (e.g., the Shapley value and the Nucleolus), others are based on simpler rules of thumb (e.g., the volume-based allocation and the Equal Pro t Method).
As every allocation mechanism is based on a number of partner-speci c characteristics (e.g., shipped volume, stand-alone cost, exibility), choosing an allocation method results in an implicit selection of the desired partner behaviour. As an example, the volume-based allocation method allocates the pro t of the coalition based on each partner's shipped volume and therefore implicitly stimulates partners to ship larger volumes. Stated di erently, by agreeing on a certain cost allocation method, the partners implicitly or explicitly formulate a number of performance indicators they deem important for the coalition. Partners that behave well according to these prede ned characteristics will be favoured by the cost allocation mechanism.
is mechanism should therefore be used as an incentive for the partners to behave in favour of the coalition (Defryn et al., 2014) . Dudek and Stadtler (2005) state that, by giving the right incentives, a solution can be obtained, that is optimal for the total coalition instead of a solution that is locally optimal for only one or a subset of partners.
ere is widespread agreement in the literature that no single cost allocation method works best in all situations. In order to be able to include problem-speci c elements into the allocation procedure, many authors therefore acknowledge the need for a case-speci c approach (Biermasz, 2012; Defryn et al., 2014; Tijs and Driessen, 1986; Vanovermeire et al., 2012) . e current literature, however, neglects the impact of the behaviour of an individual partner on the performance of the coalition. To guide this behaviour in a desirable direction, the coalition should give the right incentives to the partners, which, as mentioned, can be achieved by the appropriate cost allocation mechanism.
In this paper, we emphasize the interaction between these di erent elements -strategic partner behaviour, operational planning, and cost allocation -when operating in a collaborative environment. We focus on a relatively simple (yet realistic) collaborative variant of a wellknown vehicle routing problem, the selective vehicle routing problem. is problem is formally described in Section 2. In Section 3 it is shown how this problem can be used in a collaborative environment. Here we focus on the issue of incorporating individual partner behaviour and a cost allocation method. By means of simulation, the properties and characteristics of the selective vehicle routing problem in a collaborative environment are analysed in Section 4. We highlight the notion of bounded individual rationality in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarises the main results and gives pointers for future research. All symbols used in this paper are summarised in Appendix A.
The selective vehicle routing problem 2.1. Problem definition and mathematical formulation
In the problem discussed in this paper, both the number of vehicles and the distance each vehicle can travel, are limited. As a result, only a subset of customers can generally be served. e underlying operational problem is therefore a selective vehicle routing problem (SVRP). In the vehicle routing literature, problems in which not all customers need to be visited, but a "reward" is gained for each customer visit are usually called orienteering problems, see e.g., Bouly et al. (2010) ; Arche i et al. (2007) .
A formal description of the SVRP tackled in this paper is the following. We consider a set of c customers c i (i = {1, . . . , c}), with given coordinates in an euclidean distribution area, and a xed eet of vehicles k (k = {1, . . . , }). e cost to travel between customers i and j is represented by the distance d i j . Each vehicle can travel a prede ned maximum distance D. Furthermore, a depot is given. Each vehicle starts and ends its distribution tour at this depot.
In the SVRP both the number of vehicles and the maximum distance traveled by each vehicle are limiting resources that may prevent all customers from being visited. A compensation for non-delivery cost (CND) is therefore determined for each customer. CND i is the cost that is to be paid when customer i is not served, and may represent, e.g., a penalty paid to this customer in the form of a discount. We will elaborate on this concept in Section 3.1. e aim of the SVRP is to determine a feasible subset of customers to be served, as well as the sequence in which these customers are visited by each vehicle in such a way that the total distribution cost is minimised. is cost includes both the total travel cost and the total CND value of all unvisited customers. e SVRP therefore implicitly assumes -without loss of generality -that travel distances and costs of non-delivery are expressed in the same units.
Formally we can de ne the SVRP as a mixed-integer programming problem. A complete list of symbols appears in Appendix A. e position of customer i in the path of vehicle k is given by U ik , used in the subtour elimination constraints as done by Vansteenwegen et al. (2011) . e decision variables E i jk and Y i are de ned as follows:
1 if a visit to customer i is followed by a visit to customer j in the tour of vehicle k 0 otherwise
Constraints (2) ensure the connectivity of the path of a single vehicle, while Constraints (3) guarantee that every customer is visited at most once in the solution. Constraints (4) ensure that all vehicles start and end their trip at the depot (vertex 0). e maximal allowed vehicle distance is ensured by constraints (5). Constraints (6) and (7) take care of the subtour elimination.
A simple metaheuristic for the selective vehicle routing problem
Several algorithms have been proposed in the literature to tackle selective vehicle routing problems or team orienteering problems. e most important contributions are summarised in Table 1 . Because none of these algorithms is publicly available, we develop in this paper a straightforward randomized, multi-start variable neighbourhood search algorithm. Although we are con dent that the solutions found by our algorithm are of high quality, the aim of this paper is explicitly not to develop a state-of-the-art algorithm that can compete with the best ones in the literature. e algorithm is visualised in Figure 1 . In Table 2 the algorithm's parameter se ings, which were determined in a limited pilot study, are presented.
First a randomized nearest-neighbour heuristic is used to construct an initial solution -where nearest is de ned as a minimal (distance/CND)-ratio. In this way the solution is constructed by visiting customers that are close to the current position of the vehicle or cause high compensation for non-delivery costs if not visited. Due to this de nition, the heuristic automatically ranks customers with zero CND a er all other customers. Obviously, it is not economically meaningful to set a negative CND. Similar to a GRASP algorithm, the constructive algorithm randomly selects one of the nBest customers at each iteration. is allows it to generate different solutions, which is necessary because of the multi-start nature of the algorithm.
In a second phase the obtained heuristic solution is improved by means of local search, using the di erent neighbourhoods listed in Table 3 . ese neighbourhoods are rmly established in the vehicle routing literature, and are explored sequentially in the order mentioned here. A rstimprovement strategy is used, and every improvement encountered is accepted. If none of the neighbourhoods contains a be er solution, the current solution is saved as a local optimum. e algorithm is initiated multiple times (FullRestart times). e larger the value of this parameter, the larger the possibility to improve the current solution but this comes at the expense of larger calculation times. e solution reported is the best solution found during all iterations of the main loop. Add Add a customer to the solution if the cost of serving is not larger than the CND and a vehicle is able to ful l the order without surpassing the allowed distance (MaxDist).
SwapWithin
Swap the position of two customers in a single trip. SwapBetween Swap the position of two customers, belonging to di erent vehicles.
Remove&Add
Remove a customer from the solution and add a new customer if this lowers the total coalition cost.
Two-Opt
Remove two edges and replace them by two new edges to close the tour, decreasing the total distance, within a single vehicle.
The SVRP in a collaborative environment
In this section the SVRP is introduced in a collaborative environment in which several companies form a coalition with the aim of serving the customers of all partners in one single logistic operation. By combining their customer bases and sharing their trucks, the individual vehicle routing problems of the partners disappear and a vehicle routing problem arises at the level of the coalition. Increased opportunities for optimisation appear because customers of di erent companies can be visited by the same truck, which might result in a lower total logistics cost.
In the rest of this paper, we consider a grand coalition N , in which |N | partners p = {1, . . . , |N |} join forces. e set of vehicles is shared and for every customer c problem in a collaborative environment with two collaborating partners (white and gray) and two available trucks. Node labels represent the compensation for non-delivery (CND) for each customer. Customers with a larger CND are preferred in the solution.
Interpretation of the compensation for non-delivery cost (CND)
A property of the SVRP is that the decision whether to serve a certain customer in the operational plan is not only based on its position in the distribution area but also on its urgency for delivery. is urgency is represented by the compensation for non-delivery cost (CND), a value that can be determined by each partner individually for each of its customers. e CND of customer i (CND i ) can be interpreted as a fee that is to be paid if customer i is not served in the solution. It is awarded in order to compensate the consequences of the postponement of the corresponding order.
In a more concrete example, it can be assumed that partners give a cost reduction to their customers if they are not served on the agreed delivery date. e exact discount can be de ned by the partner individually and can be interpreted as the CND. Customers that are promised a larger discount, and therefore have a larger compensation for non-delivery cost, are more likely to be part of the optimal solution. e CND values can therefore be used by a partner to prioritize the delivery of certain customers at the expense of the other partners.
CND strategies
Since every partner in the coalition is free to set the CND for each of its customers, and since the CND values have a direct impact on the total cost of the operational solution, the way in which each partner determines its CND values will have a direct impact on the total coalition cost.
On the one hand, each partner will have an incentive to set the CND values for its customers to very high values, to ensure that as many of its customers as possible are included in the solution. However, if all partners set very high CND values, the total coalition cost is likely to increase signi cantly as some -now more expensive -customers will remain unserved. An incentive for partners to keep their CND values low, should therefore be installed. is incentive can be provided by the cost allocation mechanism: partners that consistently set high CND values for their customers should be penalized by being assigned a relatively large share of the total coalition cost. e 'collaborative' selective vehicle routing problem distinguishes itself from the (non-collaborative) SVRP in that the former requires a second issue to be tackled besides solving the routing problem: the allocation of the global coalition cost. e mechanism used to determine each partner's share in this coalition cost is called the cost allocation method.
When operating in a collaborative environment, the cost allocation method is therefore interwoven with the vehicle routing solution process. We propose a general approach that, besides solving the traditional (non-collaborative) vehicle routing problem, also takes into account the CND strategy of the individual partners by incorporating a cost allocation mechanism. is approach is visualised in Figure 3 . is framework will now be used to analyse the selective vehicle routing problem in a collaborative environment.
Partner's strategy
Operational planning
Cost allocation Feedback Figure 3 : e proposed collaborative vehicle routing approach. In a rst stage, individual partners decide on their strategy. In a second stage, the VRP is solved. Next, the coalition cost is allocated to the di erent partners. is allocation will provide feedback to the partners, who may adapt their strategy accordingly.
At the start of the collaboration, each individual partner determines its strategic position, i.e., the CND values for its customers (partner's strategy). Based on the provided compensations, the selective vehicle routing problem is solved at the level of the coalition (operational planning) and a total distribution cost is obtained. is cost is to be allocated to the individual partners (cost allocation). e allocation is done by a prede ned cost allocation method, and preferably both the obtained operational plan (routes) and the partners' individual strategy should be taken into account. It can be expected that to a certain extent, the di erent companies in the coalition remain competitors and each partner will therefore evaluate the collaboration in terms of personal gains. e cost allocation mechanism should therefore be chosen in such a way that partners are rewarded if their decisions with respect to the CND values of their customers bene t the coalition.
As the partners individual CND strategy, and therefore also the operational solution, highly depends on the resulting cost allocation, a feedback loop is included. It is expected that partners that are assigned a large share of the coalition cost as a result of exorbitant CND values will adjust their behaviour to avoid incurring such large costs in the future. e agreement on this long-term joint planning of the distribution activities is aimed at raising the number of served customers using the coalition's limited resources, while reducing costs. e creation of a strategic coalition, however, does not imply that a partner will give up personal objectives nor the lever to guide the global solution into a direction that is desirable from its individual point of view. e degree to which organisations allow a shi in decision-making towards the bene t of the coalition will determine the boundaries of the potential bene ts of the coalition (Langley, 2000) . In the literature this is referred to as the exibility of a partner (Vanovermeire and Sörensen, 2014b) . If the exibility of one of the partners is limited with respect to the operational routing, the opportunities concerning synergy and total e ciency are likely to reduce. In the selective vehicle routing problem, exible partners are those that set relatively low CND values.
Cost allocation methods for the SVRP in a collaborative environment
As explained in Section 3.2, the performance of the coalition depends to a large extent on the partners' behaviour and exibility. To ensure that partners behave and adopt a CND strategy in favour of the coalition, the right incentives should be given by the cost allocation mechanism. We therefore argue that a decision made at the operational (routing) level should a ect the cost allocation result and vice versa. is dependency is generally omi ed in the existing literature. Furthermore, by ignoring the cost allocation mechanism, it will be impossible for a partner to determine its personal bene ts when forming or joining a coalition.
Allocation methods and incentives
ere is widespread agreement on the fact that no single cost allocation mechanism produces a fair cost allocation in all situations. No method can therefore be considered as a global best practice, applicable in every scenario. In Defryn et al. (2014) , we argue that a cost (or pro t) allocation method should be selected by the coalition, based on the incentives that it gives to the individual partners. ese should be in line with the coalition's vision on success. In this way, the allocation will force its partners to behave in a way that is perceived desirable for the coalition. e volume-based pro t allocation for example, will allocate larger pro ts to the partners that transport the largest volumes. It is not questioned whether this approach is fair, but the clear incentive towards the partners to increase their volumes is undeniable as transporting larger volumes will result in a larger share of the coalition gain.
Although a coalition is free in formulating its preferred incentives, it can be recommended that these incentives should motivate the partners to adopt a exible a itude with respect to the routing problem. By behaving in a exible way, partners give a large degree of freedom to the coalition, resulting in a more e cient global routing solution.
In the collaborative selective vehicle routing problem discussed in this paper, the leverage given to the partners is the CND strategy. If all CND values are set equally for all customers, no di erentiation exists among the di erent customers. No detours are to be made in order to include more expensive customers in the solution, and the number of customers served in the solution is maximised -customers are only selected based on their locations -while minimising the total distribution cost. By imposing relatively high CND values to certain customers, the probability of taking these customers into the nal routing solution will increase. In this way, a partner is given control on the optimal choice of the routing solution. However, this might be at the expense of global e ciency -less customers can be served with the same resourcesand might raise the total coalition cost.
If the CND value of a customer is lower than its minimal marginal transportation cost (distance), it is never pro table to take this customer into the nal solution. e minimal marginal transportation cost is de ned as the minimal detour that is to be made to include this customer in any existing tour.
In this paper we investigate the behaviour of two di erent cost allocation mechanisms for the selective vehicle routing problem in a collaborative environment. First we take a look at the well-known Shapley value, commonly seen as a possible best practice by the industry. Next, these results will be compared with an alternative allocation rule, developed speci cally for the SVRP, taking into account both the CND and customer locations.
Shapley value allocation method
Based on the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) this allocation mechanism takes into account the partners' contribution to all possible (sub)coalitions and is therefore entirely based on a partner's co-operative productivity. is method is gaining popularity as it was put forward by the European CO 3 -project, a peer group of more than y important industrial companies, as a best practice in horizontal collaboration in logistics (Biermasz, 2012) . e cost allocated to partner p can be calculated by using Equation (9). e last factor of this equation represents the marginal cost of adding partner p to a possible subcoalition S. is is done by comparing the total distribution cost C (.) of the subcoalition with and without partner p. To calculate the Shapley allocation for partner p, these marginal costs should therefore be known for every possible subcoalition. Finally, the cost allocated to partner p equals then the weighted average of all these marginal di erences.
e Shapley value satis es certain axioms that are generally regarded to be important properties a cost allocation mechanism should posses. ese include symmetry, null player property, e ciency and additivity (Nagarajan and Soi , 2008) . Furthermore, the Shapley value cost allocation provides a result that is individually rational for a superadditive game (Moulin, 1988) . A de nition of these properties can be found in Table 4 . 
Symmetry
Partners that are identical are allocated the same cost. Null player property A partner who neither helps nor harms any coalition is allocated a cost equal to its stand-alone cost. E ciency e exact total coalition cost is allocated among the partners. Additivity e allocation can not be in uenced by making larger coalitions in advance. e profits, allocated to company p and q, are therefore equal to the pro t a partner would receive who represents p + q. Individual Rationality e cost allocated to a partner is not larger than its stand-alone cost.
As the Shapley value is based on the partners' marginal contribution in every possible subcoalition, it is able to properly capture the nancial impact of a single partner on the coalition.
Its drawback, however, is the need of information.
e calculation of the Shapley value requires at least an estimation or simulation of the total cost of every possible subcoalition. is might turn out very challenging or even impossible in practice as no information is available on the decision making and partner behaviour in the unformed coalitions can not be observed directly. It can only be simulated.
Furthermore, in a two-partner coalition, the Shapley value possesses the property of dividing the total coalition gain equally among the collaborating partners, without taking into account the partners' stand-alone e ciency and exible behaviour towards the coalition. In a twopartner coalition, it therefore loses any lever to stimulate exibility. A solution for this problem, however, was proposed by Vanovermeire and Sörensen (2014b) .
CND-weighted allocation method
Notwithstanding the popularity of the Shapley value, its generality might prevent it from providing the desirable incentives to its partners. Even if the Shapley value does support the right incentives, this relation might not be that straightforward for the supply chain manager. erefore, based on the idea of separable and non-separable costs (Tijs and Driessen, 1986 ), a cost allocation method is constructed in this paper that is explicitly based on the partners' CND policy and their customer locations. e CND-weighted cost allocation is constructed as follows. e separable part of the total coalition cost, i.e., linked to one speci c customer (c p i ) in the tour, consists of the marginal cost m i of adding this customer to the solution. For every customer that is served in the nal routing solution, the separable cost can be calculated as the di erence in total distance if this customer is taken into account or le out of the nal tour, without reoptimising the solution.
e remaining part of the coalition cost is called the non-separable cost and can be divided in various ways (Cruijssen, 2012) . In order to align the allocation with the incentives towards exibility, the non-separable cost will be allocated based on weights, de ned by the total CND of the customers of each partner in the nal routing solution.
e cost allocated to partner p can therefore be wri en as follows, where C (N ) is the total coalition cost, M p equals the sum of the marginal costs of the customers belonging to partner p and CND p,sol represents the sum of all compensations for non-delivery of all customers of partner p that are served in the solution.
As the CND-weighted cost allocation is completely based on the speci c SVRP parameters, the behaviour of the di erent partners in the coalition can be linked directly to the allocation results. Furthermore, we can state that for the calculation of the CND-weighted cost allocation only the result of the grand coalition is taken into account. Contrary to the Shapley value, the CND-weighted method is not a ected by stand-alone e ciency or costs and the performance of subcoalitions. We will show in our simulation results that this will result into a situation where partners with equal exibility towards the routing solution will pay the same cost for the same service.
Simulation Results
In this section we study the behaviour of the selective vehicle routing problem in di erent collaborative scenarios, focusing on the impact of a partner's characteristics and strategy on both the operational solution and the cost allocated to this partner. First, the impact of di erent CND strategies is investigated. Secondly, we study the e ect of di erent customer location pa erns, measuring the in uence of the average distance to the depot and the amount of clustering on the nal solution.
e simulation is based on a set of generated instances that are available from the authors upon request. All instances are generated on a square grid of width 100, with a central depot located at coordinate (50, 50). Without loss of generality, we assume a three-partner coalition where every partner has 15 customers and brings one single truck into the coalition. erefore, the number of available vehicles equals the coalition size for every subcoalition. e maximum distance these trucks can travel is limited to 142. All distances are Euclidean.
A xed CND of 20 is assumed for all customers of partners 2 and 3. For partner 1 di erent scenarios are considered where the CND for all customers ranges from 4 to 100. e instances are solved using the metaheuristic approach, described in Section 2.2, and costs are allocated by both the Shapley value cost allocation and the CND-weighted cost allocation. e results were obtained by running the algorithm and the cost allocation method on a set of 30 di erent test instances. All reported values are averaged over this set.
Impact of the compensation for non-delivery value
As discussed in Section 3.1 the compensation for non-delivery (CND) value is used by the partners in the coalition as a way to assign priority to their customers. erefore, the CND has a direct impact on the optimal routing solution, i.e., the solution with the minimal total distribution cost for the coalition. If all partners assign similar CND values to their customers, the number of customers served in the nal solution will be maximized as no detours to serve more expensive customers are involved. On the other hand, a non-exible a itude (high CND values) of one of the partners will generally result in a routing solution that is less e cient. In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of the vehicle routing solution to the CND values by means of simulation. For the purpose of these experiments, all customer locations were chosen according to a uniform random distribution. Figure 4 is a visual representation of the number of customers served in the nal solution. As no di erences in CND strategy exist between partners 2 and 3, both partners are treated equally by the routing algorithm, and they both have approximately the same number of customers in the nal solution. If partner 1 also imposes a CND of 20, customers of all three partners appear with equal frequency in the solution and the total number of customers served is maximised.
When the CND value of partner 1 increases for all its customers, not serving them becomes more expensive for the coalition so the algorithm will generate a solution in which more of this partner's customers are visited, at the expense of the other partners' customers, that are now served less frequently. Additionally, the in exible strategy of partner 1 will result in an increased total coalition cost (see Figure 5 ). e coalition as a whole is now functioning in a less e cient way, and partner 1 should be discouraged from se ing high CND values by the cost allocation mechanism.
When the CND values of partner 1 are much lower than those of the other partners, a drop in the total number of customers served in the nal solution can be witnessed. e decreased CND values of partner 1 render it less expensive to leave this partner's customers unserved. e total coalition cost decreases because a low CND is to be paid for the non-served customers of partner 1. e resulting cost allocations are shown in Figure 5 . When no di erences exist between the partners (all have CND of 20), both allocation mechanisms divide the costs equally. Also, when partner 1 behaves in a less exible way than the other partners, this results in a larger total coalition cost (represented by the black line), and both the Shapley value and the CND-weighted cost allocation consequently assign a larger share of the cost to this partner. Where the allocated cost increases linearly by applying the Shapley method, the CND-weighted cost allocation tends to follow more the underlying number of customers that are served for every partner. We can conclude that the Shapley value punishes the in exible behaviour directly, whereas the CND-weighted approach punishes the in exible behaviour through its e ects on the grand coalition and the number of customers served for every partner. 
Varying average distance between customers and depot
e algorithm for the routing problem preferably serves customers that (1) have large CND values, and (2) increase the total distance of the solution as li le as possible. For this reason, customers that are located close to the depot will tend to be served with a larger probability than customers located far away. In this section we study the impact of the location of a partner's customer within the distribution area and the interdependency with the CND strategy.
In our simulation, a square area of size 50 around the depot is de ned. e customers of partners 2 and 3, all having a CND equal to 20, lie inside this smaller area and, therefore, closer to the depot. e customers of partner 1, again with a variable CND, are all located outside this smaller area, and are therefore located further away from the depot.
It can be expected that customers located closer to the depot are more likely to be served in the nal routing solution. Due to a reduction in travel distance between these customers and the depot, one vehicle will be able to serve more customers without violating the maximum vehicle distance. If all customers, including those of partner 1, have a CND of 20, customers of partners 2 and 3 will have a larger probability of being served, which can also be seen in Figure 6 . e vehicles are preferably used to serve the customers that are located close to the depot. In order to include the customers of partner 1, which are located further away, a detour is to be made. For very low CND values, including these customers is not pro table as the cost of not serving them is lower than the detour to be made. In order to make the longer trips towards partner 1's customers more a ractive for the coalition, this partner needs to impose larger CND values. However, this behaviour will render the solution both more expensive and less e cient. For this reason, we expect the in exibility of partner 1 to be punished by the cost allocation mechanism. e results of both the Shapley value and CND-weighted cost allocation are visualised in Figure 7 . We can see that in both methods the in exible behaviour of partner 1 is punished by an increase in allocated cost. A very high cost, up to almost 100% of the total coalition cost, is allocated to partner 1 by applying the Shapley value method. is can be explained as follows. As the customers of partner 1 are located far away, the stand-alone cost of this partner will be signi cant larger. Furthermore, adding partner 1 to any subcoalition will reduce the e ciency and raise total cost signi cantly. For a further increase in CND a negative allocated cost will be obtained for partners 2 and 3, stating that they will receive money for joining the coalition while partner 1 pays more than the total coalition cost. Notwithstanding this (potentially undesirable) behaviour, the Shapley value cost allocation does remain individually rational, i.e., each partner is allocated a lower cost than its stand-alone cost.
As the CND-weighted cost allocation method is only based on the cost that the partners induce in the nal routing solution, the cost allocated to partner 1 tends to be small for the scenarios where less customers of this partner are served in the routing solution.
is is the case for scenarios where partner 1 is behaving in a exible way (low CND). Even if partner 1 behaves in a very in exible way, still many customers of partner 2 and 3 remain served because of their a ractive position close to the depot.
is is captured more directly by the CND-weighted method. Here again we conclude that the CND-weighted cost allocation remains closely bound to the underlying operational solution. Contrary to the Shapley value cost allocation, the CND-weighted method does not guarantee individual rationality. As the outcome of this method is only based on the nal routing solution, it does not take into account the stand-alone costs. e cost allocated to a partner is largely de ned based on the number of customers served in the routing solution of the coalition, weighted according to the corresponding CND. In this case, the customers of partners 2 and 3 are located close to the depot. Notwithstanding the maximum vehicle distance that is imposed, these partners can already serve a majority of their customers in the stand-alone scenario. As a result, only very li le (and sometimes zero) customers (with their CND) remain unserved, and the stand-alone costs of partners 2 and 3 are very low. Due to this, the costs allocated to partners 2 and 3 can easily exceed their stand-alone costs and the property of individual rationality is not guaranteed. We look into this in more detail in Section 5.
Customer clustering
In the third simulation scenario, we look at the e ect of geographical clustering of customers. If the customers belonging to each partner are located in close proximity to one another and no (or limited) geographical overlap exists between the customer clusters of the di erent partners, no signi cant collaboration synergy can be expected. If a coalition should be formed between such incompatible partners, we expect its coalition cost to be not much less than the sum of the stand-alone costs.
A set of test instances was generated in which all customers belonging to one partner are located in the same part of the distribution area. In this way customers of partner 1 are located in the North-West, those of partner 2 in the North-East and nally those belonging to partner 3 in the South. Customers of partner 3 are generated to be on average closer to the depot than the ones of the other companies.
Based on the characteristics of the test instances, the distance between the depot and the customer clusters, and between the di erent clusters is high, compared to the distance between the customers within one cluster. As a consequence it will be very expensive to combine customers of di erent clusters into one vehicle. As the customers of partner 3 are located on average closer to the depot, this single vehicle can be used to serve more customers compared to the other partners, as seen in Figure 8 .
As the customers of partner 1 will become more and more expensive for increasing values of this partner's CND, the detour of visiting two di erent clusters with one vehicle might become more a ractive in order to avoid the larger compensation costs that should be paid if the customers remain unvisited. However, this action renders the solution less e cient (less customers can be visited), and we expect this in exible behaviour to be punished again by the chosen cost allocation mechanism. As customers of partner 2 are located further away compared to these of partner 3, the cluster of partner 2 has a lower probability to be visited by a vehicle. is can be seen in Figure 8 . e resulting cost allocation is shown in Figure 9 . At rst sight it can be seen again that partner 1 was charged a larger relative part of the total coalition cost for increasing values of its CND. is scenario, however, reveals another di erence in approach for both cost allocation mechanisms studied in this paper.
When comparing the relative cost allocated to partners 2 and 3, the Shapley value cost allocation charges a larger cost to partner 2 (Figure 9a ), while this partner is favoured in the CND-weighted cost allocation mechanism (Figure 9b ). is can be explained as follows. As customers of partner 3 are located on average closer to the depot, these customers can be served with higher e ciency. erefore the stand-alone cost of partner 3 will be lower compared to that of partner 2. Moreover, this high e ciency will be present in every subcoalition. As the Shapley value takes this into account, a lower cost is allocated to partner 3 although a larger number of customers of this partner are served in the nal solution. In the CND-weighted cost allocation however, costs are allocated based on the impact of every partner on the nal routing solution. Because no di erentiation exists in the CND of customers of partners 2 and 3 both partners are treated equally. As more customers of partner 3 are taken into the nal routing solution, this partner should pay a larger share of the total cost. By applying a weighted cost allocation method like the CND-weighted allocation method proposed in this paper, a cost is assigned to a partner ranging from zero -where the partner does not pay anything -up to the total coalition cost. is may in some cases result in an allocation that is not individually rational, i.e., in which one or more partners are assigned a larger cost than their stand-alone cost. Such allocations will generally result in infeasible solutions, as the a ected partners will not accept to be charged a larger cost than their stand-alone cost, and will consequently leave the coalition.
Let X be the set of all possible cost allocations. We further de ne X I R ⊆ X as the subset of all individually rational cost allocations. e existence and size of the subset of individually rational allocations depend on the partners' stand-alone cost. In other words, the region of individual rationality of a cost allocation is bounded by the stand-alone costs.
Cost assigned to partner 1 Cost assigned to partner 2 For a two-partner coalition the concept of individual rationality is visualised in Figure 10 . e range of possible allocations is represented by segment AD. However, only solutions between B and C, calculated based on the partners' stand-alone costs, possess the property of individual rationality. In order to ensure that the collaboration remains bene cial for all partners, only solutions within the set of individually rational allocations should be considered.
Depending on the stand-alone cost of partner 1, the incentive for partner 2 to behave in a more exible way is bounded. e fact that partner 1 is not willing to pay a cost that is larger than its own stand-alone cost, and that the total coalition cost needs to be paid by the two partners, determines the minimum cost that partner 2 needs to pay. e maximum exibility of this partner is therefore limited. If the minimal cost is reached, an even more exible approach of partner 2 will not result in a cost reduction. In this situation, the cost allocation is a corner point of the set of individually rational allocations.
Clearly, these arguments are symmetrical and we can therefore state that the incentive towards exibility is bounded by the stand-alone costs of the coalition partners.
is result also acknowledges the importance of partner choice when se ing up a new collaboration.
Towards an individually rational cost allocation
By using a weighted allocation mechanism, the total coalition cost might be allocated in a way that is not individually rational. In this section, we therefore develop an algorithm that transforms an allocation that is not individually rational into one that is, while remaining as close as possible to the original allocation. For a cost allocation x X I R , a transformation is proposed towards a new cost allocation x R ∈ X I R in such a way that the distance between x Table 5 : List of symbols used in this section X Set of all possible cost allocations X I R Set of all individual rational cost allocations
x A possible cost allocation (x ∈ X ) x p Cost allocated to partner i s p Stand-alone cost of partner i e p Cost excess of cost allocation for partner i p, q partner index and x R is minimised. We therefore de ne the distance between two allocations, x and x R , as the sum over all partners of the squared di erences. As these sum should be minimised, allocation x R can be found as follows:
Subject to
x R is individually rational (13) In order to transform any cost allocation into an individually rational one, we propose the following algorithm. e algorithm makes use of the cost excess e p , de ned as the di erence between the currently allocated cost and the stand-alone cost of partner p. e p = x p − s p
If this excess is positive, the allocated cost exceeds the stand-alone cost and the solution is not individual rational for partner p. As a result, partner p will not be willing to participate in the coalition.
e proposed algorithm is based on an iterative search where the largest positive excess is reduced until it equals the stand-alone cost of the corresponding partner and, as a consequence, individually rationality is reached for that partner. e excess cost that is to be paid, is divided equally among the remaining partners. As no extra cost can be allocated to partner p, this partner is removed from the list.
is procedure is repeated until the complete solution has reached individual rationality. In this way, a partner will never be charged a cost that is larger than its own stand-alone cost while preserving the initial incentives of the chosen allocation mechanism as much as possible. e procedure assumes that the total coalition cost is lower than the sum of stand-alone costs of all partners involved. In other words, we assume the property of superadditivity. If this condition is not met, it will be impossible to obtain an individual rational solution. Even with all partners paying a cost equal to their stand-alone cost, a part of the total coalition cost will remain unpaid.
Algorithm 1 Transformation of a cost allocation in order to make it individual rational while preserving the original incentives as much as possible |N | = number of partners in the grand coalition s p = stand-alone cost of partner p x p = current cost allocated to partner p e p = cost excess of partner p given the current allocation p, q = partner indices Require:
Although the obtained allocation is now individually rational, it does not guarantee the property of stability for the coalition. A coalition is considered stable if none of the partners can improve their situation by forming a sub-coalition. In order to test this, all possible sub-coalitions and their corresponding costs have to be known. However, in real life situations, these costs are generally not known and may be hard to simulate. Furthermore, although the procedure outlined here nds the individually rational cost allocation closest to the original allocation, the distance between both allocations may be signi cant. Due to the feedback loop this might lead to a change in strategic positioning that is no longer bene cial for the group as the conversion towards individual rationality can a en the importance of the initial incentives. As a result, the fact that the coalition divides its costs in a way that is individually rational may not be su cient to ensure that all partners are comfortable in the created collaborative environment. is has to be evaluated again by every single company in a case-by-case approach. e proposed transformation is illustrated by a simple example (see also Table 6 ). Assume a 4-partner coalition with given stand-alone costs s p and a resulting cost allocation x p . As the sum of all stand-alone costs (1400) is larger than the sum of the total coalition cost ( p x p = 1300) an individual rational allocation can be found for this coalition. In a rst iteration the cost excess e p is calculated for every partner as the di erence between x p and s p . e largest excess can be found by partner C, and appears to be positive, indicating that the current allocation is not yet individual rational. e cost allocated to partner C is set equal to its stand-alone cost, and the excess of 90 is divided equally among the other partners. As a maximal cost is now allocated to partner C, it is no longer taken into account. Again the cost excess is calculated for every partner, showing still a problem concerning individual rationality for partner A (40). e cost allocated to this partner is therefore set equal to its stand-alone cost, and the excess is again divided among all other partners that are still in the list. By calculating the cost excess one last time, it can be seen that they are all negative and an individual rational cost allocation is obtained.
Conclusions and future research
In this paper we took a closer look at how a selective vehicle routing problem can be used in a collaborative environment. Besides the vehicle routing problem itself, the collaborative environments force the coalition to consider the problem of strategic positioning, as well as the allocation of the coalition cost.
In order to solve the selective vehicle routing problem, a randomized, multi-start variable neighbourhood metaheuristic was developed. Concerning the cost allocation, we discussed two di erent approaches: the Shapley value cost allocation, a widespread game-theoretical approach, and a new CND-weighted cost allocation mechanism that could be linked directly to the problem de nition of the SVRP. e solutions of the routing and cost allocation problems are both dependent on a third aspect, the strategic behaviour of the partners with respect to the collaboration. is behaviour was captured by the compensation for non-delivery (CND), the cost that is to be paid if a customer is not selected for delivery in the routing solution. We demonstrated that the strategic behaviour of the partners has a large in uence on the e ciency of the routing solution. By choosing a cost allocation mechanism, the coalition implicitly formulates incentives that it perceives important. ese incentives should stimulate the partners to behave in a exible way towards the coalition in order to assure maximal e ciency of the logistical planning. Partners that tend to pull the solution away from its optimal working point, by behaving in an in exible way, should also accept the consequences in terms of a larger allocated cost. is strong relationship between partners' behaviour, routing solution and cost allocation is o en omi ed in the literature, resulting in an incomplete view of the collaborative vehicle routing problem. By means of simulation, these dependencies were shown and tested on di erent sets of instances.
In a rst simulation, the e ect of the partners' CND strategy on the nal routing solution and cost allocation was investigated. A partner that imposes relatively larger compensations for non-delivery increases the probability that its customers are taken into the nal routing solution. However, this non-exible a itude will raise total coalition cost while serving less customers and should therefore punished in the cost allocation. e Shapley value and CND-weighted cost allocation behave similarly in this collaborative environment. e CNDweighted method tends to follow more the number of customers visited for every partner.
If the customers of one partner are more favorably located than those of the others, this pa ern will also be found in the solution. e other partners can compensate by se ing higher CND values, in which case an inferior routing solution will be chosen where a detour is made in order to visit the more expensive customers. In this simulation the severity of the Shapley value with respect to the non-exible partners becomes visible to the extent that relative cost allocations above 100% and below 0% are possible. As this might not be the preferred scenario, the Shapley value still assures an individually rational solution, which is not guaranteed when using the CND-weighted allocation method. e same conclusion can be drawn from the third simulation, where customers of di erent partners were clustered in di erent geographical regions. As this reduces the ability to combine customers of di erent partners into one trip, the trucks will choose a direction towards the area(s) where more expensive customers are located. Only when relatively high CND values are charged in one area, the solution does change in order to visit this region. is is however at the expense of a larger total coalition cost. Here, the fundamental di erences between the two cost allocation methods become clearly visible. While the Shapley value is based on the partners productivity in every possible subcoalition, the CND-weighted cost allocation is only based on the nal solution of the coalition. It is up to the collaborating partners to evaluate which approach they perceive as fair.
As mentioned, the CND weighted cost allocation method does not always result in an allocation that is individually rational. We have therefore proposed a transformation of an allocation to one that is individually rational.
In this paper, we focused on the selective vehicle routing problem and introduced a basic framework (solution approach) that can be used to analyse the vehicle routing problem in a collaborative environment. In the future, we plan to study other variants of the vehicle routing problem in a collaborative environment. A di erent vehicle routing problem will require an alternative de nition of partner behaviour and therefore also of the idea of exibility.
Furthermore, we will also examine the behaviour of what we de ne as multi-objective collaborative vehicle routing problems. Here, the partners have di erent and possibly con icting objectives with respect to an optimal routing solution (e.g., total distance, time window violation,. . . ) which should be combined into a single (co-operative) optimization problem. 
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